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INTRODUCTION

(

ongressional efforts to revise and reauthorize Superfund' have
revived long-standing debates concerning the role of institutional controls in the remediation and reuse of contaminated sites.
Institutional controls are legal constraints which limit human activities at, or access to, real property.' Examples of institutional controls include use restrictions and requirements of notices in deeds or
leases, notices in property transfer documents, building permits,
easements, well-drilling prohibitions, and zoning ordinances.'
Superfund and similar state laws employ institutional controls to
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1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. The term "institutional controls," though often used, is seldom defined,
except by way of examples. For a codified definition of "institutional controls,"
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:101B-1 (West Supp. 1995). California uses the term
"land use controls" and restricts examples to instruments recorded in the chainof-title documents. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25396(1) (West Supp. 1995).
The text of CERCLA does not specifically mention the term "institutional controls," but 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D) (1994) refers to the possible use of
"institutional controls such as water use and deed restrictions to supplement engineering controls . .. ."
3. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-1 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25396(1) (West Supp. 1995); 40 C.F.R. §
300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D) (1994).
*
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restrict use at properties that have experienced the release4 of hazardous substances,5 and that have residual on-site contamination.
The controversy about using institutional controls at Superfund
sites centers on two fundamental questions. First, should institutional controls be used only as a last resort when cleanup is impossible, or should they be used more broadly to maximize reuse of
contaminated property? Second, how can institutional controls be
enforced in the short term and, perhaps, even indefinitely?
The impetus to use institutional controls results, in part, from the
high cost and lengthy process of cleaning up polluted sites. The
business community has been reluctant to become involved with
contaminated and even formerly contaminated sites. Properties sit
abandoned, producing neither job opportunities nor tax revenues for
their communities. Many of these sites, particularly in urban areas,
affect the poor and minorities, creating questions of "environmental
justice."6 Ironically, because these sites were originally developed
for their access to business and transportation services, they are
often in commercially desirable locations. For many years, industry
has shied away from redeveloping these contaminated areas, commonly called "brownfields," 7 preferring to use undeveloped land,
which is usually far removed from old industrial sites and which
has never been used for industrial purposes.8
This Article explores the potential use of institutional controls as

4. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) defines "release" as including "any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment .... " Release also includes burial of
drums and storage containers, even if the substances inside do not leak. Id.
5. "Hazardous substance" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) to include the
hundreds of substances listed in various environmental laws and regulations.
"[W]hen released into the environment[, these substances] may present substantial
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment .... ." Id. § 9602(a).
6. See generally Robert M. Frye, Environmental Injustice: The Failure of
American Civil Rights and Environmental Law to Provide Equal Protection From
Pollution, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 53 (1993).

7. E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A. K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon:
An Analysis of Environmental, Economic and Community Concerns, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,337, 10,337-38, (July, 1995).
8. Charles Bartsch & Richard Munson, Restoring Contaminated Industrial
Sites, 10 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 74 (1994), available in LEXIS, Envim Library,
Curnws File.
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a means of encouraging voluntary remediation of contaminated
sites. Part I provides an introduction to CERCLA, with particular
emphasis on the factors that deter reclamation of contaminated
property. Part II discusses the federal approach to the use of institutional controls at Superfund sites, which, while gaining increasing
acceptance, has historically been disfavored. Part III examines the
traditional legal obstacles which could cause institutional controls to
be ineffective, and the movement away from these principles. Part
IV analyzes CERCLA section 120(h), which governs the transfer of
contaminated real property owned by the federal government, and
which may foreshadow a shift in the focus of Superfund cleanup.
Part V discusses the innovative approaches in New Jersey's
Superfund law, the Industrial Site Recovery Act, and its predecessor, the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act. Part VI analyzes the Superfund laws of seven states that have recently enacted
statutes that encourage remediation through the use of institutional
controls. Part VII evaluates recent congressional attempts to use
institutional controls in the revision and reauthorization of
Superfund. This Article concludes that the use of institutional controls are necessary for the effective remediation of contaminated
sites, and that they are the next logical step in dealing with the
problems created by hazardous waste left on real property.
I. SUPERFUND AND THE PRODUCTIVE REUSE OF PROPERTY
During the 1970s, the public became aware of pollutants affecting land, water, and air. Well-publicized incidents, like the contamination of Love Canal, New York,9 revealed the need to clean up
sites contaminated with dangerous pollution. One of Congress'

9. The Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. was aware of large amounts of
toxic waste on its property in Love Canal, New York. In 1953, the company
donated this land to the local school board with a clause in the deed waiving
company liability for future damage caused by the buried chemicals. A few years
later, the community built a grammar school on the site, and developers constructed homes around the school yard. In the mid-1970s, the impact of the site's
contamination received increasing press attention. In 1978, the Governor declared

a State of Emergency at Love Canal, and the President declared it to be a federal
disaster area. Love Canal is generally considered to have been a major influence
in Congress' decision to enact CERCLA. See Sidney M. Wolf, Hazardous Waste

Trials and Tribulations, 13 ENVTL. L. 367, 403-04 (1983).
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responses to these environmental concerns was to enact the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980,0 commonly known as CERCLA or Superfund.
The idea of treating contaminated property was a new concept,
not only to the general public and federal, state, and local governments, but also to the legal, business, and financial communities.
Over time, these sectors of society have learned more about pollution and treatment and how to assess the impact of environmental
laws, including Superfund.
Over the years, a recurring criticism of CERCLA has been that
the law does not foster the productive reuse of property." Besides
the prohibitive cost of Superfund cleanup, 2 three factors in particular deter reclamation of contaminated property: (1) CERCLA's
limitations on remedy selection; (2) the business community's apprehension about perpetual liability, including post-cleanup liability;
and (3) uncertainties about the enforceability of environmental
restrictions. Use of institutional controls at Superfund sites is inextricably linked to these three considerations.
A. Remedy Selection
Under CERCLA, remedial actions must be "protective of human
health and the environment," be "cost effective," and use "permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies or resource
recovery technologies to the maximum extent practicable."' 3 While
there can be no disagreement over CERCLA's goal of safeguarding
people and nature, there is debate regarding the appropriate approach to hazardous waste cleanup. Often, differences arise over the
question of what constitutes sufficient remediation of a contaminated site, or, more simply, "How clean is clean?"' 4
10. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 2767 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
11. See generally, Bartsch & Munson, supra note 8 (citing fear of CERCLA
liability regardless of fault as major deterrent to new investment in real property).
12. The EPA estimates that the average Superfund cleanup costs between $25
and $30 million. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM.
ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL

SUPERFUND PROGRAM, H.R. REP. No. 35, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993).

13. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988).
14. CLEAN SITES, INC., IMPROVING REMEDY SELECTION: AN EXPLICIT AND
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One perspective is that every polluted site should be remediated
to a level safe for unrestricted use, including residential occupancy. 5 Isolation or containment of contaminants, rather than destruction or removal of them, just defers problems and costs. 6 The opposing view is that a site's remedy should be tied to the property's
proposed disposition. 7 Under this approach, a site destined for
residential use would be required to meet strict residential standards, with no harmful levels of contamination remaining at the
location.' A site destined for industrial use, however, would be
subject to less rigorous cleanup standards, allowing some hazardous
substances to remain on site.' Physical containment mechanisms,
such as caps or fences, would prevent access to these dangerous
substances. ° Use of the property would be restricted by institutional controls, such as deed covenants.2 The theory underlying
the latter approach is that controlled use of a less-than-pristine site
may be as safe as unrestricted use of a pristine site. Proponents of
this position argue that the cost savings would encourage cleanups.' There is also the possibility that better and cheaper technology will be developed in the future to treat deferred cleanups.

C, at 3-4
(1990) (on file with Clean Sites, Inc., Alexandria, VA 22314).
15. See, e.g., Carl Pope, Clinton's Layaway Plan; Plans to Delay Cleaning of
Toxic Waste Sites, SIERRA, May-June 1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, Envirn
Library, Curnws File.
16. Id.
17. See CLEAN SITES, INC., supra note 14, at v-vi, viii, 13, 15, 17, 24-25, 4041.
18. See Gerald Karey, Regulation & the Environment, PLATr'S OILGRAM
NEWS, July 6, 1993, at 3 (EPA's usual practice assumes residential use), available in WESTLAW, PLATTON Database.
19. EPA's 'Flexibility' on Ground Water May Not Meet Concerns of Industry,
GROUND WATER MONITOR, June 16, 1994, available in WESTLAW, GRWM
Database.
20. Karey, supra note 18.
21. United States v. Wheeling Disposal Serv. Co., 92-0132-CV-W-1 (W.D.
Mo. Feb. 12, 1992).
22. See William K. Reilly, When Perfection Protects Pollution: By Demanding Too Much, the Superfund Law Delivers Much Too Little, WASH. POST, July
31, 1994, at C3 (the former Administrator of the EPA from 1989 to 1993 discussing cost-effectiveness of site-specific remediation criteria).
INTERACriVE PROCESS FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM 5-7 & app.
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B. PerpetualLiability

Superfund's broadly defined basis for liability23 deters business
and industry from involvement with sites known to contain poilution.24 Even after a site has been treated for contamination, however, it may remain an ostracized piece of real estate. Potential owners and lenders may fear that they will be held liable if additional
contamination is subsequently discovered, or if more stringent future cleanup standards were to be applied retroactively.25
CERCLA itself provides little guidance to assuage such concerns.
There is an "innocent landowner" defense, but this provision is applicable only in limited situations. Also, for many years, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") would only enter into
covenants not to sue prospective purchasers if: (1) the purchaser
participated in the remediation; (2) the cleanup or payment for
cleanup would not otherwise have been available; and (3) an enforcement action was being considered for the facility in question.27 In May of 1995, the EPA issued a new directive on this
topic, expanding opportunities for prospective purchasers to enter
into covenants not to sue.28 Such agreements are now possible in
23. Superfund imposes retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability on
owners, operators, generators, and transporters. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
24. See S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1994) (noting the "chilling
effect" environmental laws have on redevelopment of contaminated property).
25. Bartsch & Munson, supra note 8. See H.R. REP. No. 582, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 98 (1994) (quoting EPA Ass't. Admin. Elliott Laws as stating that,
"[tihe present reluctance to voluntarily clean up sites is due, in part, to the uncertainty that cleanups may require regulatory action in the future").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). This defense, which is difficult to establish, requires proof that the non-polluting landowner lacked knowledge of contamination, and exercised due diligence to ascertain contamination. See also
Bruce P. Howard & Kevin E. Solliday, CERCLA and Similar State Laws: Overview and Current Developments, The Impact of Environmental Regulations on
Business Transactions and Operations, in THE IMPACT OF ENvIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON BuSmESS TRANSACTIONS AND OPERATIONS § II(4)(C)(1)(b)
(1992), available in WESTLAW, ENV-TP Database (PLI Handbook Series No.
B4-7026, 1992).
27. Guidance on Landowner Liability Under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA,
De Minimis Settlements Under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 54 Fed. Reg.
34,235, 34,241-242 (1989).
28. Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of
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two situations: when the Agency receives substantial benefit, because the purchaser conducts or provides funds for cleanup, or
when the Agency receives a lesser benefit, but there is a concurrent, substantial benefit to the community in the form of redevelopment of the site. 9 Covenants not to sue may be considered for
sites where EPA action has occurred, is underway, or is anticipated.

30

C. Enforcement of Institutional Controls
The inherent dangers in allowing contaminants to remain on-site
require that land-use restrictions to manage such pollution be unquestionably effective. But instances when institutional controls
might fail to achieve their objectives come readily to mind. For
example, planning commissions do not routinely examine covenants
in deeds during comprehensive planning or zoning and could, thus,
inadvertently rezone environmentally restricted land for residential
use. Similarly, local building officials ordinarily do not consult real
property transfer instruments when issuing construction permits and
could unintentionally approve actions that would disturb toxic soil.
Zoning restrictions based on environmental concerns are subject to
revision by subsequent boards. Also, requirements that owners
provide disclosure notices about contamination to lessees, purchasers, or lenders can serve as an1 alert about the pollution, but do not
3
assure proper use of the site.
From a legal viewpoint, there is another obstacle to using institutional controls. While restrictions in deeds may seem like a
straightforward means of establishing environmental restrictions,
such an approach poses problems because of traditional property

Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, to Regional Administrators, Regional Counsel and Waste Management Division Directors, EPA (May 24, 1995)

(on file with the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Wash.,

D.C.).
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Guimond Weighs In on Maywood Cleanup, SUPERFUND WEEK, Jan. 28,
1994 (stating that deed restrictions at radiological sites in New Jersey, where
zoning laws are not strict, have been known to fail), available in WESTLAW,
SPFU Database.

8

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII

law on servitudes. The courts have not favored enforcement of deed
restrictions against parties who are not signatories to the original
deed.32
II. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS IN THE NATIONAL
CONTINGENCY PLAN

The text of CERCLA does not contain the term "institutional
controls." 33 CERCLA regulations, however, do use this term in
connection with remediation procedures under the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").34 The regulations state:
EPA expects to use a combination of methods, as appropriate, to
achieve protection of human health and the environment. In appropriate site situations, treatment of the principal threats posed by a
site, with priority placed on treating waste that is liquid, highly
toxic or highly mobile, will be combined with engineering controls
(such as containment) and institutionalcontrols, as appropriate, for
treatment residuals and untreated waste.35

The regulations also state that institutional controls, "such as water
use and deed restrictions," may be used throughout the remediation
process "and, where necessary, as a component of the completed
remedy."36
When determining the appropriate remedy for a site, the lead
agency must consider "a range of alternatives."37 This continuum

32. See infra notes 83-116 and accompanying text.
33. While the term "institutional controls" does not appear in CERCLA, there
are two sections which refer to examples of such controls. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(h), which deals exclusively with the transfer of federal facilities, deeds
and certain other documents must include information about the type and treatment of hazardous substances at sites. See infra text accompanying notes 114129.
There is also a reference to "land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title or possession" in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), which defines "contractual relationship." However, this listing of examples of institutional controls is
mentioned in connection with a liability issue, the "innocent landowner defense,"
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), and not with the use of property remediation and reuse.
34. CERCLA refers to the NCP at 42 U.S.C. § 9605. NCP regulations are
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1994).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(C) (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D).
37. Id. § 300.430(e)(3)(i).
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should include, at one end, "an alternative that removes or destroys... contaminants to the maximum extent feasible, eliminating or minimizing, to the degree possible, the need for long-term
management."38 The other end of the spectrum should consist of:
[o]ne or more alternatives that involve little or no treatment, but
provide protection of human health and the environment primarily
by preventing or controlling exposure to hazardous substances...
through engineering controls, for example, containment, and, as
necessary, institutional controls to protect human health and the
environment and to assure continued effectiveness of the response
action.39
A. Emphasis On Treatment
While the regulations refer to institutional controls as an integral
part of the remediation process, such controls are considered less
desirable than methods which actively treat the waste.
The use of institutional controls shall not substitute for active
response measures (e.g., treatment and/or containment of source
material, restoration of ground waters to their beneficial uses) as
the sole remedy unless such active measures are determined not to
be practicable, based on the balancing of trade-offs among alternatives that is conducted during the selection of remedy.'
If residual hazardous substances remain on site after remediation,
the federal government must review the site no less than every five
years and arrange for corrective actions if necessary.4
The legislative history of the 1990 regulations provides some
insight to the Congress' restrained attitude toward using institutional controls. The Conference Report for the 1986 Superfund Amendments explains that: "Remedial actions involving permanent treatment are preferred over those not involving such treatment ....
The President ... must select remedial actions that utilize permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent practicable. 42

38. Id.
39. Id. § 300.430(e)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).

40. Id. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D).
41. Id. § 300.430(f)(4)(i) to (4)(ii).
42. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245-46 (1986), reprinted
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When regulations were promulgated in 1990, the EPA reported
the arguments of those who had urged greater use of institutional
controls.
These commentors wanted the rule to allow institutional controls
to be used as a key component of a remedy whenever they provide
similar protection to treatment or other active remedies at much
lower cost. The commentors suggested that such controls may be
the only cost-effective, practicable remedy at small, isolated, and
stable sites,
and that such controls would be viable at many federal
43
facilities.

The EPA rejected these suggestions because "CERCLA section 121
states Congress' preference for treatment and permanent remedies,

as opposed to simple prevention of exposure through legal con44
trols."
Various legal challenges to the NCP portion of the 1990 regulations were consolidated and adjudicated in 1993.' 5 Among other
issues, the petitioners objected to EPA authorizing institutional

controls "as a sole remedy at Superfund sites."' They feared that
EPA would use "cost considerations to select a cleanup remedy that
may not comply with the minimum human health and environmental protectiveness requirements of CERCLA and to select a remedy
in which there is no treatment or removal of contaminants."'47
The court reviewed statements in the Federal Register published
at the time the regulations were promulgated' and commented
that "any remedy relying on institutional controls must meet the
threshold requirement of protectiveness."'49 In general, however,

the court found that a decision on the issue would be premature and
would be "better resolved in the context of a specific application ....

"'

in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2979, 3338-39.
43. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55
Fed. Reg. 8666, 8706 (1990).
44. Id.
45. Ohio v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 1536.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8702.
49. 997 F.2d at 1537.
50. Id.
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In Ohio v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,5
state governments and environmentalists pointed out a conflict in
Superfund, which still exists.52 Superfund aims for total, permanent cleanup, but must deal with the practical considerations that
limit that goal, a dilemma closely tied to the issue of using institutional controls. Debate on this subject continues as CERCLA
reauthorization approaches.
B. State Responsibility For Institutional Controls
Land-use regulation, which is managed by institutional controls,
has historically been the responsibility of state and local governments. 3 CERCLA regulations reflect the federal government's
deference to the states in this area. Before Superfund monies are
used to finance a cleanup, the state where the facility is located
"must assure that any institutional controls implemented as part of
the remedial action at a site are in place, reliable, and will remain
in place [as necessary]."54 In fact, whenever operation and maintenance are implemented as part of a site's remedy plan, with the
exception of the restoration of ground or surface water, the State
must assume responsibility for the operation and maintenance,
"including, where appropriate, requirements for maintaining institutional controls ... ."" Similarly, if EPA decides that real property must be acquired to perform a remediation the State "must
agree to acquire and hold the necessary property interest.., to
ensure the reliability of institutional controls restricting the use of
that property."56

51. 997 F.2d 1520.
52. Id.
53. Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental
Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 33, 41 (1989).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(1) (1994). In the Federal Register preamble for the
publication of this regulation, EPA acknowledged that institutional controls have
been among those powers reserved to the states by commenting "that EPA may
not have the authority to implement institutional controls at a site." 55 Fed. Reg.
8666, 8706 (1990).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 300.435(f).
56. Id. § 300.515.
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C. Examples Of Institutional Controls Under Superfund

Despite the controversy about the use of institutional controls,
EPA employs these restrictive mechanisms as part of the
remediation process at many Superfund sites. Information about
institutional controls is desultory. "[I1n most records of decision,
reference to institutional controls consists of little more than the
statement 'and institutional controls."' 5 7 Fortunately, other documents provide some indication of the types of institutional controls
being implemented. An informal survey of these documents indicates that EPA often requires that water and land restrictions be
recorded in deed notices or deed covenants, sometimes in conjunction with zoning restrictions. EPA occasionally requires environmental access easements as well. For example, a portion of the
remedy for an improperly closed landfill in Wisconsin was the
installment of "deed restrictions [to prevent] ... new releases from
the site by building on or excavating soil ... ."' At a site in
Yakima, Washington, further use of a particular building was prohibited.5 9
In an unusually descriptive Record of Decision ("ROD") involving an electroplating facility in Miami, Florida, the remedy consisted, in part, of a reinforced concrete pad and institutional controls to
"ensure the effectiveness of the cap."' Such controls included
fencing, signs, monitoring and "[r]ecording of deed restrictions to
control future uses incompatible with the remedy., 6 '
Sometimes zoning action is part of a site remediation. The ROD
for the Miami electroplating facility also stated that "[z]oning restrictions for future land use already exist and deed restrictions
57. Douglas J. Sarno, Risk and the New Rules of Decisionmaking: The Need
for a Single Risk Target, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,402, 10,403 (July,
1994).
58. National PriorityList Descriptions (NPLDSC) of Hazardous Waste Sites,
Aug. 1993, WID980823082, Mid-State Disposal, Inc. Landfill, Wis., available in
LEXIS, Envirn Library, NPL File.
59. National PriorityList Descriptions (NPLDSC) of Hazardous Waste Sites,
Aug. 1993, WAD040187890, Yakima Plating Co., Wash., available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, NPL File.

60. Records of Decision, Oct. 1, 1993, FLD00414514D, Airco Plating Co.,
Inc., available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, RODS File.
61. Id.
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controlling soil excavation and the construction of buildings would
be recorded."6 2 Zoning regulations "to prohibit development" in a
mine tailings depositary were deemed necessary in South Dakota.63
The list of sites being deleted from the National Priorities List
("NPL"), which appears in the Federal Register, provides fairly
descriptive information about institutional controls at those sites. A
site in Plymouth, Massachusetts is subject to deed restrictions prohibiting "[tihe site property [from] . . . be[ing] used for residential,
school, hotel, motel, community and/or recreational purposes unless
a study conducted by a qualified engineering or environmental
consulting firm ... indicates to EPA and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts that there is no public health threat . . . ."' A Florida site being considered for deletion from the NPL had a "Conservation Easement ...filed with the County ...[which] allows EPA
or the State to enforce deed restrictions on the Site property."65
III. LEGAL OBSTACLES

To PROPERTY USE RESTRICTIONS

The most frequently employed institutional controls under
CERCLA are use restrictions, easements, and deed notices.' Although these institutional controls have been implemented at many
Superfund facilities, whether such controls can be enforced as long
as necessary to protect human health and the environment, perhaps
indefinitely, is still questionable. To appreciate the legal obstacles
to using institutional controls in the Superfund framework, it is
necessary to understand the history of land-use restrictions and the
ambiguities attached to the enforcement of servitudes.67

62. Id.
63. National PriorityList Descriptions (NPLDSC) of Hazardous Waste Sites,

Aug. 1993, SDD980717136, Whitewood Creek, S.D., available in LEXIS, Envim
Library, NPL File.
64. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan National Priorities List, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,804, 44,806 (1993).
65. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan National Priorities List, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,882, 56,883 (1992).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 57-65 and infra text accompanying
notes 114-129.
67. A "servitude" is a "charge or burden resting upon one estate for the benefit or advantage of another ....

."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1370 (6th ed.

1990). "'[S]ervitude' ... has relation to the burden or the estate burdened, while
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A. History Of Easements And Deed Restrictions

In the Superfund context, environmental access easements allow
the government to enter property to monitor use restrictions which
prevent exposure to residual pollution." Restrictive covenants are
the provisions attached to the deed which restrict use of the property, for example, by forbidding soil disturbance, requiring containment caps or slurry walls, or prohibiting water use or well drilling.69 As the following discussion illustrates, the common law has
treated easements quite differently than covenants.
1. Access Easements
Historically, courts have been reluctant to favor long term encumbrances on land.70 Easements, however, have encountered
much less judicial resistance than deed restrictions and are quite
common. 7 ' An easement can be defined "as the right to a limited
use or enjoyment of another's land ... .,7' The classic example of
an easement is the right of way across one piece of property, the
servient tenement, 73 to allow ingress and egress to another landlocked piece of property, the dominant tenement.74 Such an arrangement is called an "appurtenant easement"75 because of the
easement's relationship to the dominant tenement.
Besides the appurtenant easement, there exists an easement "in
gross." 76 This type of easement "does not belong to any person by
'easement' refers to the benefit or advantage or the estate to which it accrues."
Id.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 3839 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing government to
enter into environmental easement agreements).
69. Often state Superfund laws call for deed "notices" rather than covenants.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-13a(2) (West 1992 & 1995 Supp.). For
practical purposes, these are the same since both are property use restrictions
integrated into the local land recordation system.
70. See Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1265 (1982).
71. Id. at 1263-64.
72. JOHN M. CARTWRIGHT, GLOSSARY OF REAL ESTATE LAW 298 (1972).
73. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 455 (1944).

74. See id. § 456.
75. See id. § 453.
76. See id. § 454.
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virtue of ownership of estate in other land but is mere personal
interest in or right to use land of another . . ,,77Utility line easements or conduits for gas, water, and oil are examples of easements
ingross.
There are many positive easements which give "someone other
than the title owner the right to do something regarding the
land." 78 Examples of positive easements are the right to travel
across another's property, hunting or fishing rights, or subsurface
rights to coal or other minerals. Similar easements exist in
Superfund. When the federal government transfers property under
CERCLA section 120(h), the deed must contain an access easement
to assure the government any necessary entry to conduct future
remediation 79
Access easements to search for contamination or to monitor compliance with environmental restrictions have not been tested in the
courts. To the extent such things can be predicted, easements permitting the government to enter private property to inspect the
status of contained pollution and to make necessary corrections
seem compatible with common law.
2. Restrictive Covenants in Deeds
To be enforceable, deed covenants which restrict property use
must comply with a complicated set of legal rules which have
evolved over the centuries.80 In order for such encumbrances to be
enforceable against successors-in-title, they had to be drafted to
"run with the land."81 The law of running covenants has been described as "the most complex and archaic body of American property law remaining in the twentieth centuiy. ' 82 Over the years,
courts have developed four technical prerequisites to create a "running covenant at law," which is also known as a "real covenant."

77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1990).

P. DAVIS, LAND USE 79 (1976).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C), (h)(4)(D)(ii) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see
also infra text accompanying note 128.
80. See French, supra note 70, at 1269-70 nn.42-43.
78. KENNETH

81.

RALPH

E.

BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY

SURVEY 320-22 (4th ed. 1991).

82. French, supra note 70, at 1261.
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First, the covenant must be enforceable between the covenanting
parties and satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 3 Second, the covenanting
parties must intend to bind successors." Use of the word "assigns"
or "successors" is considered persuasive of an intent to bind successors, although not required.85 Third, there must be "privity of
estate.,1 6 There are two forms of privity: "horizontal privity" and
"vertical privity." Horizontal privity exists where there is "a relationship between the original parties, covenantor and covenantee ...."87 Vertical privity pertains "to the relationship between
the covenanting parties and their assignees.""
The types of environmental covenants written into deeds to restrict land and water use would probably comply with the three
prerequisites just described. However, these environmental covenants would not comply with the fourth requirement, that the covenant must "touch and concern" the land.89 A deed covenant touches and concerns the land if it calls "for the doing of a physical
thing to land."' Similarly, covenants "to refrain from doing a
physical thing to land, such as covenants not to plow the soil, not
to build a structure... "91 also fit into this category. It would
seem that a deed covenant prohibiting soil disturbance or use of a
well would fall neatly into this framework. In reality, this is not the
case because "[i]f [either] the benefit or burden of the covenant
does not touch or concern the land, then it does not run with the
92
land."
When the owner of contaminated property puts a restrictive covenant into the deed to comply with governmental requirements, the

83. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 522 (1944).
84. See id. § 531.
85. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 475 (1984).
86. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 534-35 (1944).
87. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 85, at 477-78 (footnote omitted).
88. Timothy C. Shepard, Termination of Servitudes: Expanding the Remedies
for "Changed Conditions," 31 UCLA L. REv. 226, 232 n.33 (1983).
89. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944).
90. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 85, at 471.
91. Id.
92. Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property:
Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928, 939
(1988).
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burden of the covenant falls on the land of the property owner. The
benefit which accrues to the government, however, is not connected
to government property; it exists "in gross." Therefore, the covenant does not run with the land and is not enforceable against successors-in-title. Most courts 93 and the Restatement (First) of Property94 take the position that the benefit of a real covenant, for purposes of the touch-and-concern requirement, may not be in gross.
The minority rule is that the burden of a real covenant may run
even if the benefit is in gross. 95
Because plaintiffs experienced difficulty in getting the law courts
to uphold real covenants at law, they sought redress in the equity
courts. Covenants that run in equity are called equitable
servitudes.' The elements of an equitable servitude are somewhat
different from those of a real covenant.9 7 Equitable servitudes do
not require privity of estate, and they require that the burdened
owner must have actual or constructive notice of the encumbrance
on the property. Equitable servitudes, however, must still meet the
same requirements of form, intent, and "touch and concern" as real
covenants.9" Consequently, environmental deed restrictions would
encounter the same obstacles in equity as they would in law.
A deed restriction which serves as an institutional control at a
contaminated site is a relatively new creation in the realm of property and real estate law. Such a restriction would appear to be enforceable between the government and the signatory property owner
as the original parties to the contract." It would not, however,
necessarily be enforceable against successive owners. The issues of
"touch and concern" and "benefit in gross," as discussed above,
could interfere with future enforcement of the covenant.
Courts have not allowed these technicalities to dictate absolutely

93. See, e.g., Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 101 P.2d 490, 492 (Cal. 1940);
Stegall v. Housing Auth., 178 S.E.2d 824, 829 (N.C. 1971).

94. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 454 (1944).
95. See, e.g., Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194, 195-196 (Ill. 1913); Neponsit
Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795-97
(N.Y. 1938).
96. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 85, at 484.
97. Id. at 485.
98. See id. at 485-94.
99. See BOYER, supra note 81, at 320.
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the outcome of such cases. For example, many modem courts allow
neighborhood associations to enforce restrictive covenants, even
when the associations own no property."° The courts have developed a theory of "implied reciprocal servitude" or "implied reciprocal negative easements" between the homeowners' individual properties to explain these decisions, although there is considerable
confusion about the rationale involved.''
B. Modern Trends
1 2
Proposed revisions for the Restatement (Third) of Property0
would introduce a radically different perspective. The revisions are
predicated on the premise that "servitudes are useful devices that
people should be able to use without artificial constraints."'0 3 The
draft Restatement treats easements, profits, and covenants collectively as servitudes."°
A Restatement revision currently under consideration would eliminate "the rhetoric of touch and concern,"' 5 a major obstacle to
environmental deed restrictions. Proposed section 2.6(b) would state
that "[t]he benefit of a servitude may be held personally, in gross,
or as an appurtenance to an estate or other interest in land." 6
Thus, the revision would remove the need for the benefit of the
covenant to be tied to a land interest.
The Reporter's Note states that "[g]ovemmental bodies should be
able to enforce servitudes imposed for their benefit even though
they own no specific land to be benefited by performance of the
covenant."' 7 Conservation and historic preservation servitudes are
already often held in gross."°8 The draft Restatement offers an illustration in which a servitude was sanctioned when the land owner

100. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 15 N.E.2d 793.
101. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 85, at 498-504.
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1989).
103. Id. at xix.
104. Id. at xxiii.
105. French, supra note 92, at 940.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.6(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1989).
107. Id. § 2.6 reporter's note, at 70.
108. Id. at 71.
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agreed with a conservation organization to limit land use to agricultural and conservation purposes." ° This is not far removed from
an owner's agreement to neither disturb soil nor dislocate a cap
over contamination.
There is no case history on the subject of governmental use of
Superfund-type restrictive covenants. However, one early case,
Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co.,"' bears some relevance.
A road through the town of Middlefield crossed over a bridge that
was maintained by the town. In order to build a dam which would
flood the bridge, a local miller agreed with the town to build a new
bridge and maintain it. A successor-in-interest to the miller refused
to repair the bridge. The town did the necessary maintenance, but
sought to collect damages from the new owner, claiming that the
agreement between the miller and the town was still in effect because it ran with the land, or more specifically in this case, ran
with the bridge. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ultimately allowed the agreement to stand, even though it was "in
gross."''. One modem commentator has stated that Middlefield
recognizes the "unique role of government in holding and enforcing
servitudes in gross created for the benefit of the public .... ""
The extent to which the proposed changes on servitudes will be
included in the Restatement (Third) of Property and to which states
will adopt such recommendations is speculative. These proposed
changes, however, reflect the thinking of property law specialists
that there is a need for "increased use of benefits in gross, particularly for governmental and conservation purposes ....
,,I'

109. Id. at 64.
110. 35 N.E. 780 (Mass. 1894).
111. See id. at 782.
112. Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV.
433, 476 (1984).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 4.6 cmt. at 66

(Tentative Draft No. 4., 1994).
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IV.

CERCLA SECTION 120(H), PROPERTY TRANSFERRED BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES

A. 1986 SARA Amendments
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"),114 which added section 120 to
CERCLA.'15 Under section 120, the federal government has the
same responsibility for environmental restoration on federally
owned sites that non-governmental entities have on privately held
sites. Section 120(h) deals with the transfer of federally owned real
property "on which any hazardous substance was stored for one
year or more, known to have been released, or disposed
of .... 116 Section 120(h) refers to three different types of institutional controls: notices in sales or transfer contracts, deed notices,
and deed covenants.
Regarding sales or transfer contracts, section 120(h) states that
any contract for the sale or other transfer [of such property must
contain] notice of the type and quantity of such hazardous substance and notice of the time at which such storage, release, or

disposal took place, to the extent such information is available on
the basis of a complete search of agency files." 7

Section 120(h) also requires that:
each deed entered into for the transfer of such property by the
United States to any other person or entity shall contain(A) to the extent such information is available on the basis
of a complete search of agency files(i) a notice of the type and quantity of such hazardous
substances,
(ii) notice of the time at which such storage, release, or
disposal took place, and
(iii) a description of the remedial action taken, if

114. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1613 (1986) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).

115. Section 120 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(1), (h)(3) (1988).
117. Id. § 9620(h)(1) (emphases added).
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any ....

In addition, the SARA amendments require a covenant within the
deed which warrants that:
(i) all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the
environment with respect to any such substance remaining on the
property has been taken before the date of such transfer, and
(ii) any additional remedial action found to be necessary after the
date of such transfer shall be conducted by the United States. "9
CERCLA, as a whole, is concerned with identifying and cleaning
up contaminated properties. Only section 120(h), however, addresses the critical link between the contaminated site and the institutional controls which bind that property to the legal and commercial
framework in which all real estate exists.
B. 1992 CERFA Amendments
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, as a result of the end of the
Cold War and budget constraints, the federal government decided to
2
close hundreds of federal facilities, including military sites. 1
Rapid turnover of the real estate to new job-producing, tax-enhancing businesses was necessary to mitigate the local economic impact
caused by the closings.12 ' The vacated facilities have valuable assets, such as runways, ports, office space, warehouses, and housing,
as well as undeveloped areas suited for open space, parks, or wildlife refuges. 2

118. Id. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (emphases added).
119. Id. § 9620(h)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
120. See Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2623 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (Supp. V 1993)); Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, div. B, Title XXIX, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1485 (1990) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687
(Supp. V 1993)); see also Cleaning Up Federal Facilities: Controversy Over an
Environmental Peace Dividend, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2659 (Feb. 5, 1993).
121. Cleaning Up Closing Bases Will Cost More, Take Longer Than Estimated,
CBO Predicts, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1385 (Sept. 11, 1992).
122. See generally id. (redevelopment efforts are considered crucial to softening the economic blow to the communities where the bases are located); David C.
Morrison, Batting Cleanup, 24 NAT'L J. 2492 (1992); Art Pine, Lingering Death

22

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII

Most of these federal facilities require environmental
remediation.'23 Congress and the public became aware that the
lengthy CERCLA remediation process and confusion about future
liability for cleanup was delaying transfer and development of the
property. On October 19, 1992, Congress enacted the Community
Environmental Response Facilitation Act ("CERFA") 24 to expedite the transfer of these federal facilities.
CERFA made three major changes to CERCLA section 120(h).
First, it permits parcelization, that is, the agency responsible for a
site can identify and transfer uncontaminated portions of a facility.- 25
' EPA must concur that the parcel is clean if the facility is on
the National Priorities List ("NPL")
and the state must concur if the
26
installation is not on the NPL.
Second, the amendments addressed concern about potential liability for future owners if additional contamination were to be subsequently discovered on the parcels. CERFA requires that the deed
for the transfer of an uncontaminated parcel must contain a covenant stating that the United States will conduct such future response
or corrective action on the parcel sites.127 To assure that the government can carry out potential future remediation, CERFA also
requires an access easement clause to
be included as a covenant in
128
parcels.
clean
for
deeds
the transfer
CERFA also addressed the situation which arises when a site is
safe for limited use, but requires some ongoing treatment of residual waste. Section 120(h)(3)(B)(i) requires a covenant in transfer
deeds which declares that "all remedial action necessary to protect
human health and the environment ... has been taken before the
date of such transfer." Yet some remedies, like treatment of con-

of an Air Base Stalls Recovery, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at AI.
123. See Cleaning Up Federal Facilities: Controversy Over an Environmental
Peace Dividend, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2659 (Feb. 5, 1993).
124. Pub. L. No. 102-426, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 2174 (codified at 42

U.S.C. § 9620(h)(4) (Supp. V 1993)).
125.
126.
127.
128.

42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
Id. § 9620(h)(4)(B).
Id. § 9620(h)(4)(D)(i).
Id. § 9620(h)(4)(D)(ii).
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taminated ground water, can take decades. The new amendments
clarify that the necessary level of remedial action is met and transfer may occur
if the construction and installation of an approved remedial design
has been completed, and the remedy has been demonstrated to the
Administrator to be operating properly and successfully. The carrying out of long-term pumping and treating, or operation and
maintenance, after the remedy has been demonstrated to the Administrator to be operating properly and successfully does not preclude the transfer of the property. 29
C. Combining Environmental and Economic Objectives
Section 120(h) reflects a redirection in CERCLA, albeit only for
federal facilities. Congress had to find a way to hasten clean up at
federal sites and to make such sites marketable. Consequently,
Congress proceeded to revise those aspects of CERCLA that would
interfere with the transfer and redevelopment of these facilities.
The SARA and CERFA amendments relating to federal facilities
reflect a change in congressional thinking about CERCLA. By these
legislative changes, Congress acknowledged that fears of future
liability must be addressed in order to foster redevelopment of
Superfund sites, that hazardous substances might be safely managed
over time even while the site is in use, and that clean parcels might
be severed from a site as a whole. The wording of the amendment
itself, shows that the Congress further recognized the usefulness of
institutional controls, specifically, deed covenants on future
remediation and access easements, to effectuate transfers of the
properties.
While section 120(h) continues to adhere to Superfund's objective of cleaning up hazardous waste, it also reflects Congress's concern about expediting remediation and fostering redevelopment of
Superfund sites. CERCLA section 120(h) provided an indication of
the Superfund reauthorization and revision that would follow.

129. Id. § 9620(h)(3).
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V. NEW JERSEY'S INDUSTRIAL SITE RECOVERY ACT (ISRA): A
PARADIGM FOR TYING REMEDIATION TO FUTURE LAND USE

A. ECRA, Predecessor to ISRA
In 1983, New Jersey enacted the Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act ("ECRA"). 3 This was the first state law to require
governmental oversight and approval of environmental cleanups as
a precondition to closure, sale, or transfer of industrial establishments. 13 Over time, it became apparent that ECRA's stringent
requirements were discouraging, rather than assisting, the transfer
of property and growth of business.'32
In the early 1990s, in an effort to encourage economic development, New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") developed proposed regulations for new cleanup standards
for ECRA sites. 33 The most significant aspect of these proposed

130. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West Supp. 1995).
131. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-7 (West Supp. 1995). "'Industrial establishment'
means any place of business engaged in operations which involve the generation,
manufacture, refining, transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of
hazardous substances or [hazardous] wastes on-site, above or below ground,
having a Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] number [within specified groupings as defined by the U.S. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget]." Id. § 13-lK-8; see also G
& S Investors Frelinghuysen Ave., Inc. v. Aristocrat Leather Prods., Inc., 607
A.2d 682 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding that the mere storage of
heating oil subjects businesses with relevant SIC classifications to ISRA requirements).
132. See New Jersey Replaces ECRA, HAZNEWS, Aug. 1993, available in
LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File (quoting then N.J. Gov. Jim Florio, stating
that ECRA had become a "bureaucratic nightmare, hindering both cleanup and
further economic development at sites"); see also ECRA Reforms Streamline
Cleanup Process, Allows DEPE to Adopt Differential Standards, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 364 (1993); Steven Lang, N.J. Revising ECRA Law on Environmental
Responsibility for Property Transfers, HAZARDOUS WASTE Bus., June 16, 1993,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Curnws File.
133. Cleanup Standardsfor ContaminatedSites, ProposedNew Rules: NJA.C.
7:26D, 24 N.J. Reg. 373 (proposed Feb. 3, 1992). Another major incentive for
New Jersey to develop the proposed regulations was a court decision which
called for NJDEP to prepare formal cleanup standards, rather than to continue
operating on a case-by-case basis. Avon Prods., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't Envtl.
Protection, 579 A.2d 831 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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regulations was a "two-tiered approach,"'34 that tied standards for
soil cleanup with those for future land use.
If a site were improved to meet the more rigorous of the two sets
of standards, the property would be entitled to unrestricted future
use, including residential use.'35 Property remedied to a non-residential set of standards would be restricted to non-residential
use.'36 In the latter instance, "institutional controls [would] be
applied to condition future site use consistent with the level of
cleanup achieved."' 37 Although these regulations were never formally adopted, the author believes they have attracted a considerable amount of attention and have greatly influenced thinking about
possible revisions to Superfund and similar state laws.
B. ISRA: A New Focus For Property Reclamation
Governor Florio signed an amended ECRA on June 16, 1993,
renaming ECRA the Industrial Site Recovery Act ("ISRA"). 38
ISRA attempts to balance environmental protection and economic
development. The Legislature's preface to the amended law lists the
reasons New Jersey was compelled to revise ECRA. It is a summary of the revisionist thinking about contamination cleanup developing in other states and at the national level.
[A]t the time of [ECRA's] passage, the extent of the state's indus-

trial contamination and the cost and complexity of remediations
were not well understood; ... in the intervening years, there has
been a significant advance in the body of knowledge concerning
how to remediate contaminated sites effectively and how to manage the remediation efficiently ... the regulated and financial
community is now more familiar with the liabilities involving
contaminated property and with the necessity to discover and
remediate that contamination; and ... it is in the interest of the
environment and the state's economic health to promote certainty
in the regulatory process by incorporating that knowledge to create
a more efficient regulatory structure and to allow greater privat-

134. 24 N.J. Reg. 373, 376.
135. Id. at 376, 393.

136.
137.
138.
to -13

Id. at 376, 397-400.
Id. at 376, 398, 400.
1993 N.J. Laws 139 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6
& 58:10B-1 to -14 (West Supp. 1995)).
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ization of that process where it is possible to do so without incurring unnecessary risks to the public health or the environment.'39
ISRA calls for remediation standards based on considerations of a
site's "location, the surroundings, the intended use of the property,
the potential exposure to the discharge, and the surrounding ambient conditions, whether naturally occurring or man-made.""''
Thus, ISRA continued the two-tiered approach of residential and
non-residential standards 4 . that DEP had proposed in 1992, but

which had not been formally adopted. 42 Non-residential standards
can be applied only when "access to the site [is] restricted in a
manner compatible with the allowable use of that property.' 43
Non-residential standards are dependent on the use of engineering
controls which restrict access" and institutional controls which
define allowable land use. 45
ISRA states a preference for permanent remedies." The law,
however, permits residual contamination at levels above "soil
remediation standards for residential use or non-residential use if
the implementation of institutional or engineering controls at that
site will result in the protection of public health, safety and the
environment." 47
Different remediation standards may be applied on different portions of a property. Parts of a site where "a person may come into
contact with soil" must be cleaned to residential standards, while
other parts may be cleaned to non-residential standards, provided
that "engineering and institutional controls can be implemented and

139. 1993 N.J. Laws 139 § 2.
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-12a.
141. Id. § 58:101B-12c(1).
142. Id. 24 N.J. Reg. 373.
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-12c(1).
144. ISRA's definition of engineering controls includes "caps, covers, dikes,
trenches, leachate collection systems, signs, fences and access controls." Id.
§ 58:10B-1.
145. ISRA provides that "institutional controls may include, without limitation,
structure, land, and natural resource use restrictions, well restriction areas, and
deed notices." Id.

146. Id. § 58:10B-12g(1).
147. Id. § 58:10B-12g(2).
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maintained."'"
Remedy selection must consider the pragmatic factors of natural
background levels, 49 implementation within a reasonable time
frame, 150 and cost. 5' Regarding cost, DEP is currently developing regulations which will "provide a cost-based preference for
the use of permanent remedies."'52 However, the regulations will
allow the owner/operator of a contaminated site to demonstrate 53that
"the cost of all available permanent remedies is unreasonable."'
The New Jersey Legislature rejected deed covenants as the proper
mechanism to restrict use at sites with residual contamination 54-- perhaps to avoid potential enforcement problems. 55 Instead, for properties cleaned to non-residential standards and subject
to engineering and institutional controls, ISRA requires that a notice
about the environmental status of the property be registered in local
land records. 56 Such records must describe existing contaminants,
physical on-site controls, and the limitations necessary to maintain
those controls.5 7
DEP has designed a "Declaration of Environmental Restrictions," 58 which has not yet been officially adopted. Two clauses
of this Declaration merit particular attention. The first attempts to
avoid adverse impact on property marketability. It states that the
Declaration serves solely as a notice of restrictions, and does not
"create any interest in real estate in favor of [the State, or] ... a

148. Id. § 58:10B-12g(3).
149. Id. § 58:10B-12g(4).
150. Id. § 58:10B-12g(7).
151. Id. § 58:10B-12g(8).
152. Id. Prior to DEP issuance of regulations, DEP "shall not require a person
performing a remedial action to implement a permanent remedy unless the cost of
implementing a non-permanent remedy is 50 percent or more than the cost of
implementing a permanent remedy." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. § 58:10B-12h(3).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 66-113.
156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-13a(2).
157. Id.
158. Declarationof Environmental Restrictions (on file with the N.J. Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, Bur. of Envtl. Evaluation and Cleanup Responsibility Assessment, Trenton, N.J.).
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lien or encumbrance against the Property ....159
The second noteworthy clause maintains the enforceability of the
environmental restrictions beyond the parties signatory to the Declaration. It states that the use restrictions are "binding upon Owner
and upon Owner's successors and assigns, and the Department, its
agents, contractors, and employees, and to any other person performing remediation under the direction of the Department."''
The owner further agrees to assure that "all leases, grants, and other
written transfers of interest" in the property shall "contain a provision expressly requiring all holders thereof to take the property
subject to the use restriction and not to violate any of the conditions of this Declaration of Environmental Restrictions.''
New purchasers are protected if DEP adopts more stringent
remediation standards in the future. The then existing owner or
operator, or the remediator, is not automatically liable for the cost
of additional remediation. Only "a person who is liable to clean up
and remove [the] contamination ... shall be liable for any additional remediation costs" to achieve compliance with the applied standards.1 61 Such liability does not attach "unless the difference between the new remediation standard and the level or concentration
of a contaminant at the property differs by an order of magnitude.' ' 163 If a party responsible for remediation elects to use engineering or institutional controls, that party is liable for additional6
remediation if the controls are determined to be inadequate.'
Failure by a responsible party to "maintain the engineering or institutional controls as required by the department"
will subject the
6
party at fault to various penalties and actions.1 1
By offering concessions for potential future liability, New Jersey
seeks to attract prospective purchasers to reuse contaminated
properties. The state also offers financial incentives to voluntary
remediators by making loans and grants available to help finance

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-13e.
Id.
Id. § 58:10B-13f.
Id. § 58:10B-13d.
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response actions."6
New Jersey's ISRA reflects a shift away from the "full-cleanup,
permanent treatment, at any cost" mentality of the earlier days of
Superfund-type laws. While liability attaches indefinitely to the
responsible polluters, new purchasers, operators or remediators are
not subject to such liability, even if the State subsequently enacts
more rigorous standards. ISRA attempts to balance environmental
concerns with economic considerations, and settles for less rigorous
cleanup as long as exposure is kept to safe levels. The pillars supporting ISRA's new approach are differentiation of cleanup standards based on analysis of exposure risks, coordination of remedy
selection with anticipated land use, and reliance on institutional
controls to manage contained pollution.
VI. NEW STATE LAWS EMPHASIZING USE RESTRICTIONS
In general, State Superfund laws emulate CERCLA and emphasize the goal of fully eradicating contamination. They use institutional controls primarily as warning notices about the existence of
pollution, not to aid in the reuse of property. Several states, however, have enacted laws which encourage productive, although
restricted, utilization of property that retains controlled contamination.'67
These programs are not identical, but do share certain significant
characteristics. They all provide some level of relief from strict
liability after cleanup has been accomplished. Covenants not to sue
remediators, prospective purchasers, and successors-in-interest help
relieve fear of perpetual liability. Furthermore, these states extend
additional incentives to perform cleanup activities, ranging from
expediting the bureaucratic process to offering loans and grants to
conduct the response action and tax abatements following
remediation168
All seven states discussed below provide for expanded remedy

166. Id. §§ 58: 10B-5 to -6.
167. See Barbara Ruben, Fields of Dreams? Revitalizing Industrial
Brownfields, 26 ENVTL. ACTION, Jan. 1995, at 12, available in LEXIS, Envirn
Library, Curnws File (mentioning briefly voluntary cleanup programs in Ohio,
Minnesota, Illinois, Oregon, Colorado, California, New Jersey, and Connecticut).
168. See generally Howard & Solliday, supra note 26.
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selection beyond the traditional Superfund preference for treatment.
They allow containment strategies when projected exposure levels
are deemed to be safe. Consequently, these states all require consideration of future property use in making determinations about remedy selection. Institutional controls, usually in the form of deed
restrictions or notices, play an important role in the remediation and
reuse of contaminated sites. All of these states use local chain-oftitle records to manage use restrictions. Each has enacted statutory
provisions to overcome common law obstacles to enforcement of
property use restrictions.
Following are analyses of such programs in Minnesota, Michigan,
Indiana, Connecticut, Ohio, California, and Pennsylvania. Each of
these states has recently enacted legislation which promotes contamination cleanup and which relies on the use of institutional
controls in the remediation process.
A. Minnesota
In the late 1980s, Minnesota initiated one of the earliest state
programs to foster voluntary remediation and restoration of
"brownfields," although that term had not yet been coined." 9
Minnesota is unique because it offers essentially full release from
future liability to persons who are not responsible for the contamination at a site but who voluntarily undertake and complete response actions at the site. 7 This protection extends to the owner
of the site, provided the owner is not responsible for the pollution,
as well as to persons who provide financing for the cleanup or who
acquire and develop the site, and to successors or assigns of all
these persons who have protection from liability. 7 ' A person who
bears responsibility for the release of a hazardous substance re-

169. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West Supp. 1995) (amended in 1995
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168, available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Legis File).
Minnesota's program is known as the Voluntary Investigation and Cleanup Program ("VIC").
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.175.1(a), 3(d). This liability exemption is
rescinded if a person contributes to the release of unremedied, contained pollution
or commits fraud or misrepresentation in conjunction with the voluntary
remediation. Id. § 115B.175.7(1)-(3).
171. Id. § 115B.175.6.
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mains subject to liability indefinitely. However, if that responsible
person voluntarily undertakes and completes an approved response
action at a site, freedom from potential liability is conferred upon
future site owners, persons who finance the cleanup or redevelopment of the site, and successors in interest to those persons qualifying for exemption from liability.'
In May of 1995, the EPA and the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency signed a Memorandum of Agreement, stating that voluntary
remediators who comply with the State's program will not be subject to Federal Superfund liability. Such liability will attach, however, if the EPA were to find that the site posed a threat tantamount
to an emergency situation.'73 In keeping with its emphasis on reuse of sites, Minnesota's law defines remedial action broadly.
Remediation includes not only "cleanup of released hazardous substances ... [and] on-site treatment or incineration," but also "storage, confinement[,] ... perimeter protection[,] ... provision of
alternative water supplies, and any monitoring and maintenance
reasonably required .. .
Despite early efforts to encourage cleanups, Minnesota was not
among the initial states to tie remedial standards to anticipated land
disposition. It was not until 1995 that the Minnesota legislature
amended its laws concerning selection of remediation standards.
Now, when "determining the appropriate standards to be achieved
by response actions," the State "shall consider the planned use of
the property where the release or threatened release is located."' 75
This revision will undoubtedly increase the use of containment
strategies at restricted-use properties.
Under the voluntary program, when the State and a remediator
reach an agreement on the appropriate response actions for a site,

172. Id. § 115B.175.6a.
173. Memorandum of Agreement (on file with the U.S. EPA, Regional Office,
Chicago, ILL.). EPA entered into a similar agreement with officials from Illinois
prior to entering into the Minnesota compact. Id. See also Minnesota's Superfund
Shield: An Innovative Minnesota Program Entices Developers to Clean Up Polluted Urban Land, PLANNING, June 1995, at 24, available in LEXIS, Envirn Li-

brary, Curnws File.
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.02.16(a).
175. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 § 3 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115B.17 subd. 2a), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Legis File.
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the owner of the property must sign an agreement indicating willingness to comply with property use restrictions. 76 A statutory
provision indicates that this agreement must bind the owner's "successors and assigns."' 177 The owner must record this agreement, or
a state-approved memorandum summarizing the agreement "with
the county recorder 17or registrar of titles of the county where the
property is located.' 1
B. Michigan
In the last two years, Michigan has overhauled its environmental
protection laws, including its Environmental Response Act, and
consolidated them into one code section.'79 Recent revisions to the
law incorporate many of the pro-business trends observable in other
State Superfund laws. For example, Michigan has adopted procedures to assign proportional liability to responsible parties in place
of strict liability. 80 The State also may issue covenants not to sue
prospective purchasers who agree to redevelop "vacant manufacturing or abandoned industrial site[s]."'' Such a covenant must,
however, provide an environmental easement, that is "an irrevocable right of entry" so that the State or its agents may perform any
necessary response activity or monitor compliance.8 2 When the
state or local government is exempt from the definitions of owner
and operator under the State Superfund law, 83 the exempt status
may be transferred "to a subsequent purchaser of the facility or a
person that obtains control of the facility through a lease or other

176. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175.2(a)(3).
177. Id. § 115B.175.2(c).
178. Id.
179. Environmental Response Act, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 451 (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324 (West Supp. 1995)) (repealing and replacing
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.601-.618 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995)).
180. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20129.
181. Id. § 324.20133(1).
182. Id. § 324.20133(4).
183. See id. § 324.20101(s)(ii) (dealing with situations in which the state or
local government involuntarily acquires ownership or operation of contaminated
facilities through situations such as "bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment[, ... seizure, receivership or forfeiture").

1995]

INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS

instrument." '84 The new owner must be willing to "develop the
facility pursuant to an economic development plan approved by the
governing body of the local unit of government in which the facility is located."' 85 If proceeds from the sale of the property or other
sources of cleanup funds are insufficient to cover remediation costs,
"the state or local unit of government shall propose deed restrictions on future uses of the facility and any institutional controls
necessary to assure the protection of public health and safety."' 86
Following the property transfer, "[a]ny required deed restrictions on
future uses of the facility [must be] recorded with the register of
deeds for the county in which the facility is located."' 87
In June, 1995, Michigan added several significant environmental
provisions, revising how the State will handle responses to the
release of hazardous substances. 8 Henceforth, the State will tie
cleanup criteria and remedial action to a range of land use options,
namely residential, commercial, recreational, and industrial. 8 9 Local zoning must be compatible with the proposed remediation level."9 Different levels of cleanup may be applied at discrete portions of the facility.' 9 '
When cleanup criteria are less stringent than residential standards,
local land records must contain two types of documentation. First,
the owner or remediator must record "a notice of approved environmental remediation" in the county register of deeds where the facility is situated, within three weeks after the State approves the
cleanup plan.' 92 Second, use restrictions that involve containment
of hazardous substances must be recorded in a restrictive covenant,
which must also be registered with local land records.' 93 Both the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
1995

324.20134a(1).
324.20134a(l)(c).
324.20134a(1)(d).
324.20134a(3)(c).
Mich. Pub. Acts 71 § 20120a-20120b (to be codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a-20120b), available in LEXIS, Envim Library,
Code File.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 20120a(6).

191. Id. § 20120a(7).
192. Id. § 20120b(2).
193. Id. § 20120b(4).

34

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII

deed notice and covenants
are binding on successors-in-interest and
19 4
land.
the
run with
If the owner of a site intends to convey any interest in land about
to be remediated or subject to post-remedial use restrictions, the
owner must provide notice to the State.'95 The State must retain
an access easement to monitor compliance with use restrictions on
remediated sites.'96 When the State deems restrictive covenants to
be unnecessary or impractical it may use other options. The legislation offers the example of using "an ordinance that prohibits use
of groundwater or an aquifer" in place of a restrictive covenant.'9 7
In such a case, the local government could not alter the ordinance
unless the State were notified at least 30 days prior to such
modification.'98
C. Indiana
In 1992, Indiana was among the first states to encourage voluntary cleanup of old, industrial areas.'99 The Indiana law was developed to encourage rejuvenation of inner-city sites, although it is
not limited to that goal.2" Sites subject to pending state or federal
enforcement actions are not eligible to participate in this voluntary
program. 0 ' For those sites accepted into the program,2 2
"remediation" is defined to include "cleanup or removal 2 3 as
well as containment; that is, "[a]ctions consistent with a permanent
remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions ... so
that the hazardous substances or petroleum do not migrate."' 4

194. Id. § 20120b(2), (4).
195. Id. § 20120b(4)(c).
196. Id. § 20120b(4)(d).

197. Id. § 20120b(5).
198. Id.
199. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-1 to -24 (Bums 1990 & Supp. 1995).
200. See James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and InnerCity Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 56-57

(1994).
201. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-10.
202. See id. §§ 13-7-8.9-7 to -8, -12 (application and acceptance procedures for
Indiana's voluntary remediation program).

203. Id. § 13-7-8.9-5(3).
204. Id. § 13-7-8.9-5(2).
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Prior to state approval of an applicant's proposed response action,
the members of the local community have the opportunity to review
and comment on the work plan and may request a public hearing.2"5 Once a remediation plan is underway, if a dispute arises
between the State and the voluntary remediator, it is settled by
arbitration, adjudication, or other dispute resolution procedures.2'
After the workplan is successfully completed, the State issues the
remediator a "certificate of completion," a copy of which is attached to the recorded deed for the property." 7 The Governor also
signs a "covenant not to sue" the remediator for liability related to
the releases that were the subject of the approved and completed
work plan, although liability still attaches to any releases "unknown" at the time of the cleanup."08 This covenant also bars any
claims, public or private, arising from the release of those contaminants addressed in the voluntary remediation.2 The terms of the
covenant also apply to successors-in-interest in the property."'
The covenant does not, however, absolve the remediator from liability under federal law.2"
D. Connecticut
Connecticut initiated its Urban Sites Remediation Action Program"' in 1992 to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of
"brownfields."21 3 To be eligible, properties must meet three criteria: they must be located in "distressed municipalities;" the State
must own the property or have approval over redevelopment plans;
and, either, the State can not determine who is responsible for the
contamination, or the responsible party has not taken appropriate
remedial action.1 4 One ambitious provision in the program, al205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. § 13-7-8.9-15(b)(2).
Id. § 13-7-8.9-13(a)(2).
Id. § 13-7-8.9-17.
Id. § 13-7-8.9-18.
Id.
Id. §§ 13-7-8.9-18(b)(2)(A) to (B).

211. Id. §§ 13-7-8.9-18(a), -24. See also O'Reilly, supra note 200, at 58-59
(discussing why federal action is unlikely).
212. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133m(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1995).
213. Id. § 22a-133m(a).
214. Id. § 22a-133m(b).
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though not implemented to date, allows the State to acquire ownership of contaminated property, to accept liability for remediation
costing up to fifteen million dollars, and then to sell or lease the
property for redevelopment." 5
In 1995, Connecticut expanded its remedy selection process for
all hazardous substance cleanups, both voluntary and mandatory.
The State still prefers "cleanup methods that are permanent, if
feasible." '16 But now the State will "provide for standards of
remediation less stringent than those required for residential land
use for polluted properties which ...were historically industrial or
commercial property . . . , provided an environmental use restriction is executed for any such property."1 7 Non-residential standards may not be applied to properties already subject to "an order,
'
consent order or stipulated judgment."218
One provision sets up new procedures for voluntary
remediations." 9 Another allows the Commissioner of Environmental Protection to enter into covenants not to sue persons who
are not responsible for the contamination on a particular site, or on
any other properties, and who redevelop the site. 2 If the State
brings a civil action against potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")
for the contamination at a site, those PRPs may not, in turn, bring
civil suits for contributions against those persons who were the
subjects of covenants not to sue.2
Formerly, when the State required use restrictions at sites with
residual contamination, the owner was required to file an environmental use restriction in a registry maintained by the Commissioner
of Environmental Protection.222 The 1995 Amendments now re-

215. Id. § 22a-133m(e).
216. 1995 Conn. Acts 190 (Reg. Sess.) § 10 (to be codified at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-133k(a)), available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Code File.
217. Id. § 10 (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k(a)).
218. Id.
219. Id. § 2.
220. 1995 Conn. Acts 183 (Reg. Sess.) §§ 9(a)-(b), available in LEXIS, Envim
Library, Code File.
221. Id. § 10 (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133m(d)).
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133o(a) (West Supp. 1995), amended by
1995 Conn. Acts 190 (Reg. Sess.) § 12, available in LEXIS, Envim Library,
Code File.
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quire the owner to "execute and record an environmental use restriction... on the land records of the municipality in which such
land is located." '23 Such a restriction may be recorded only if all
parties with interests in the property subordinate their interests to
the environmental restriction.2 Therefore, this restriction is expected to survive mortgage foreclosure, lien, or similar encumbrances."'
The statute indicates that "[a]n environmental use restriction shall
run with the land, shall bind the owner of the land and his successors and assigns, and shall be enforceable notwithstanding lack of
' This
privity of estate or contract or benefit to particular land."226
language is specifically designed to withstand judicial challenges
under traditional property law. 27 To abate any concerns about enforcing use restrictions, the Connecticut law provides that, if a court
finds "for any reason that an environmental use restriction is void
or without effect," the owner must abate the pollution to levels
acceptable for residential or recreational uses.2
E. Ohio
Effective September 28, 1994, Ohio began a Voluntary Cleanup
Program for property contaminated by hazardous substances and
petroleum.22 9 The program appears to be directed at sites with
minimal to medium levels of contamination, that have not been
scheduled for cleanup. Heavily polluted properties already earmarked for remediation under federal or state environmental laws
are excluded from participation.23 ° The law is an attempt to stimulate business activity by addressing the dilemma of "brownfields."
A Property Revitalization Board serves as a clearinghouse to foster
economic and financial incentives for persons undertaking voluntary

223.
STAT.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

1995 Conn. Acts 190 (Reg. Sess.) § 12(a) (to be codified at CONN. GEN.
§ 22a-133o(a), available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Code File.).
Id. § 12(b) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k(o)(b)).
Id. § 12(e) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k(o)(e)).
Id. § 12(b) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133(o)(b)).
See supra text accompanying notes 66-113.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133r (West Supp. 1995).
OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.35, .99 (Anderson 1995).
See id. § 3746.02.
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cleanups."' To promote cleanups, Ohio exempts participating
owners from any increase in real estate taxes for ten years after the
voluntary cleanup. 32 Under certain circumstances, counties and
municipalities may enter incentive agreements with business enterprises who, by remediating a site, create or preserve employment
opportunities at the site or enhance the local economic climate.233
Incentives can include reduced personal property taxes, lowered
assessments, or reduced costs for services. 3
Voluntary remediators, who bear no responsibility for polluting a
facility, may pursue civil actions to recover proportional shares of
cleanup costs from owners, operators, and other parties responsible
for the contamination. 35 Voluntary remediators who contributed
to the pollution may pursue civil suits only against other contributing parties. 36 The new law allows containment as a remediation
strategy and supports the use of both engineering and institutional
controls. For example, "remedy" is defined as:
actions that are taken at a property to treat, remove, transport for
treatment or disposal, dispose of, contain, or control hazardous
substances or petroleum, are protective of public health and safety
and the environment, and are consistent with a permanent remedy,

including, without limitation, excavation, treatment, off-site disposal, the use of engineering or institutional controls or measures...

and implementation of an operation and maintenance agreement
[to monitor engineering controls].37
Section 3746.05 indicates that institutional controls, engineering
controls or treatment may be selected to remedy a site as long as
the established standards for that site are attained and maintained.
The law calls for "separate generic numerical clean-up standards
based upon the intended use of the properties after completion of
voluntary actions, including industrial, commercial and residential
uses ....,23 "Property-specific" risk assessment procedures may

231. Id. § 3746.08.

232. Id. §§ 5709.87(B)-(C).
233. Id. §§ 5709.88(B)-(D).
234. Id. §§ 5709.88(D)(1)-(3).

235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. § 3746.23(B).
Id.
Id. § 3746.01(N).
Id. § 3746.04(B)(1).

1995]

INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS

be used as possible alternatives to numerical standards and will
identify the amount of contamination that can safely be left onsite. 39 Among other factors, the risk assessment procedures must
consider scientific data, exposure levels, use of institutional and
engineering controls, climatic influences, surrounding land use, and
"[d]iffering levels of remediation that may be required when an existing land use is continued compared to when a different land use
follows the remediation." 2" If a "certified professional"' 4 indicates that a property has been cleaned to prescribed levels, the State
will issue a covenant not to sue, which generally removes the threat
of future civil liability for the voluntary remediator, except for
nature resource damage or failure of engineering controls.242 If a
property subject to institutional controls is put to a non-complying
use, the covenant not to sue is voided.243
This Voluntary Cleanup Program relies heavily on the chain-oftitle records at the county level. Covenants not to sue, "no further
action" letters, and any restrictions on the use of property must be
"filed in the office of the county recorder of the county in which
the property is located by the person to whom the covenant not to
sue was issued and shall be recorded in the same manner as a deed
to the property." 2" These letters, covenants, and restrictions, as
well as operation and maintenance agreements for engineering
controls, must "be entered as a memorial on the page of the register
where the title of the owner is registered., 24 5 To preempt traditional property law challenges to land use restrictions, Ohio's statute provides that "no further action letter[s], covenant[s] not to sue,
and use restrictions, if any, shall run with the property" 2 and
may be transferred to successors-in-interest.247

239. Id. § 3746.04(B)(2)(a).
240. Id. §§ 3746.04(B)(2)(b)(1)-(b)(iv).
241. Id. § 3746.01(E).

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. §§ 3746.12(A)-(A)(2)(c).
Id. § 3746.05.
Id. § 3746.14(A).
Id. § 3746.14(B).
Id. § 3746.14(A).
Id. § 3746.14(C).
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F. California

With the passage of the Expedited Remedial Action Reform Act
of 1994," California established "a pilot program to determine if
expedited procedures for carrying out response actions at response
action sites are appropriate and protective of human health and the
environment." 49 The project will include up to thirty sites, although only ten of those sites may have "orphan share[s]," ' sites
where a portion of the liability for cleanup costs is attributable to
persons "who are insolvent or [who] cannot be identified or locate d. ,, 5
Parties responsible for site cleanup recommend their respective
sites for inclusion in this program to a Site Designation Committee
in the California Environmental Protection Agency. 2 2 To be eligible, a site must require significant remediation 23 and may not be
on the National Priority List or owned or operated by the federal
government. 4 Furthermore, there must be funds available in the
Expedited Site Remediation Trust Fund2 5 to cover orphan
shares,
25 6
unless other responsible parties agree to bear that cost.
Once a site has been designated for remediation, the State contacts the city or county in which the site is located to learn the
"planned use of the site, including the current and future zoning .... ," The State presumes that the local government's
planned use designation is the appropriate use for the site, although
the State may rebut that presumption with substantial evidence. 8
After the site is selected, the State enters into an enforceable agreement with one or more responsible parties who agree to take the
necessary remedial actions and who agree to pay the State's on248.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§

25396-99 (West 1995).

249. Id. § 25396.5(a).
250. Id. § 25396.5(b).
251. Id. § 25396(m).
252. Id. § 25396.5(b). See id. § 25261 for a description of the Committee's
membership and responsibilities.

253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. § 25396.6(b).
Id. § 25396.6(c)(1).
Id. § 25399.1(a).
Id. § 25396.6(c)(2).

257. Id. § 25398(d)(1).
258. Id.
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going response costs. 259 The Department of Toxic Substances
Control and the responsible parties sign covenants not to sue each
other, conditioned on compliance with the terms in the enforceable
agreement.2" Eventually, the State apportions liability among all
of the responsible parties, and adjustments are made accordingly.26' A site owner may request permission to sell or lease parcels
of the site that do not require remediation.26 Net proceeds from
such parcels are to be held in trust. These funds are to be used to
cover remediation on contaminated portions of the site if adequate
funds are not otherwise available.263
Remedies selected for a site must "[pirovide long-term reliability
'
at reasonable cost."264
Response actions include traditional methods of removal and reduction by treatment of hazardous substances.265 Also appropriate are "[p]roven and effective engineering
controls and appropriate land use controls to eliminate or mitigate
risk at a site when utilized for its planned use." 2' Treatment and
removal of contaminants, rather than control, must be applied to
those "discrete areas within a site" that have high concentrations of
contamination, highly mobile contaminants, or contaminants "for
which containment cannot prevent significant risk ... "267 Even
in such serious situations, however, engineering and land-use controls may be used in conjunction with treatment and removal, as
long as there is no "significant risk of harm from exposure. '
With the exception of those portions of a site harboring particularly
dangerous pollution, the law provides that there will be "no special
preference to one or more available types of response action, including engineering and land use controls, treatment, removal, or
other methods of protection ....,269
The remediation strategy for

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. §§ 25398.2(b)(1)(A)-(I)(B).
Id. §§ 25398.2(b)(1)(C), (c).
Id. § 25398.2(b)(1)(B).
Id. §§ 25398.5(a)(1)(A)-(a)(1)(F).
Id. § 25398.5(a)(2).

264. Id. § 25398.6(a)(2).

265. Id. §§ 25398.6(b)(2), (b)(3).
266. Id. § 25398.6(b)(1).

267. Id. § 25398.6(d).
268. Id.
269. Id. § 25398.6(c).
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a site must be based "on the individual merits of each option, or
combination of options, reasonably available in light of site-specific
conditions."27
Disputes between the State and PRPs may be resolved by an
arbitration panel. 27' The statute sets out the required composition
of such a panel. It must be comprised of three private sector mediators with expertise in arbitration and with other relevant experience
and qualifications.272
California's pilot project relies on institutional controls, managed
through local chain-of-title records. Code section 25398.7(a) provides that "[a] remedial action plan may utilize land use controls to
limit or restrict land use where appropriate. All land use controls
shall be recorded by the site owner in the county in which the site
is located." The statute describes "land use controls" as:
recorded instruments restricting the present and future uses of the
site, including, but not limited to, recorded easements, covenants,
restrictions or servitudes, or any combination thereof, as appropriate. Land use controls shall run with the land from the date of recordation, shall bind all of the owners of the land, and their heirs,
successors, and assignees, and the agents, employees, and lessees

of the owners, heirs, successors, and assignees, and shall be enforceable by the department ....73
Violation of the land use controls are subject to a civil penalty of
up to $25,000 per day. 74
G. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a three-bill legislative package in May of 1995 to encourage voluntary clean-ups
and redevelopment of contaminated industrial sites.275 Pennsylva270. Id.
271. Id. §§ 25398.10 to .13.
272. Id. § 25356.2(c). One arbitrator is selected by the state, the second by the
PRP, and the third by the first two arbitrators. Id. § 25356.2(d).

273. Id. § 25396(1).
274. Id. § 25398.7(b).

275. Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, 1995 Pa.
Laws 2, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allcde File; Economic Development
Agency and Lender Liability Act, 1995 Pa. Laws 3, available in LEXIS, Envirn
Library, Allcde File; Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act, 1995 Pa.
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nia now offers low-interest loans and grants for up to 75 percent of
the cost of environmental assessments and clean-up to voluntary
remediators who did not cause the contamination.276 Once voluntary remediators have completed their response actions and have received state approval, they are neither subject to further liability nor
subject to civil actions by responsible parties or citizen suits. 7
Liability for voluntary remediators may be reopened, however, if,
for example:
new information confirms the existence of an area of previously
unknown contamination... [, or] the level of risk is increased...
due to substantial changes in exposure conditions, such as in a
change in land use from nonresidential to a residential use,....
[or] the remedy relied in whole or in part upon institutional or
engineering controls... [, and] treatment, removal or destruction
278
has become technically and economically feasible on that part.

For industrial sites without a financially viable PRP and sites in
designated enterprise zones, 279 the State may enter into agreements with a person who redevelops the fallow site. That person's
liability will be limited only to the "remediation of any immediate,
direct or imminent threats ...

,

such as drummed waste, which

would prevent the property from being occupied for its intended
purpose."2 ' In passing the new legislation, the General Assembly
declared that "[c]leanup plans should be based on the actual risk
that contamination on the site may pose ... , not on cleanup policies requiring every site in this Commonwealth to be returned to a
pristine condition. 28 ' Remediators may choose from several

Laws 4, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allcde File.
276. Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, 1995 Pa.
Laws 2 §§ 702(a)-(b), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allcde File.
277. Id. § 501(a). There are some instances in which liability may be reopened,
such as a finding of fraudulent compliance with standards, discovery of new
information on previously unknown contamination, changes in exposure conditions (switching from non-residential to residential use), or when treatment has
become technically and economically feasible for residual, contained contamination. Id. § 505.
278. Id. §§ 505(2), (4), (5)(I1)-(III).
279. Id. § 305(a).
280. Id. § 502(b)(1).
281. Id. § 102(6).

44

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII

cleanup options, none of which is preferred over the others. Cleanup can be done to background (pre-contamination) levels, to statewide health standards, to site-specific standards based on the intended use of the site, or to any combination of these three
standards. 82 Institutional controls alone, such as fencing and future land use restrictions, may not be used to attain either the background standard283 or the state-wide health standard.28 4 In both
of these instances, however, institutional controls may be used if
background or state-wide health standards are attempted, but cannot
be achieved. 5
A decision to use site-specific soil and groundwater cleanup
standards must consider exposure factors based on current and
planned future land use, as well as "the effectiveness of institutional
' When
or legal controls placed on the future use of the land."286
site-specific standards are applied, response actions consisting
"solely of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions" are
permitted only if such measures would suffice as remediation for
the site at the time contamination is discovered.2 7 This provision
attempts to prevent a remediator from opting for a non-treatment
response simply by "lowering" the future use of a site, for example,
rezoning from residential to industrial.
If residual pollution remains after a facility has been cleaned to
site-specific standards, the State issues an order for use restrictions. 8 This order must be filed with the local recorder of deeds
'2 9
to allow its disclosure "in the ordinary course of a title search.
In addition, present and future holders of an interest in the property
have disclosure responsibilities whenever they convey interest in
the site. The grantor of the interest must ensure that there is a
"deed acknowledgement," which is a statement of environmental
information about past hazardous substance releases, in the deed's

282. Id. §§ 301(a)-(b).
283. Id. § 302(b)(4).

284. Id. § 303(e)(3).
285. Id. §§ 302(b)(4), 303(e)(3).
286. Id. § 304(0(1).

287. Id. § 304(i).
288. Id. § 304(m).
289. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6018.405, 6020.512(B) (1993).
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property description.29
Pennsylvania's new law does not limit restricted use cleanups to
previously developed lands. According to one critic, "this law could
have the reverse effect of what was intended-taking away any
special incentive for the reuse of existing industrial lands, and also
potentially restricting the use of thousands of acres of as yet undeveloped lands for future generations."'
VII. FEDERAL SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION AND REVISION

A. Intensified Controversy Prior to Reauthorization
As the Superfund reauthorization approached, 92 the law's remedy selection process and limited use of institutional controls received increasing attention. In 1992, the Congressional Budget
Office reported that about $2.6 billion could be saved over five
years by replacing CERCLA's "present statutory preference for
permanent treatment technologies [with] an emphasis on institutional controls ...

and containment methods."293 Soon after this

report, Congressman John Santorum (R-Pa.) sponsored a bill to
amend CERCLA section 121(a) to
give a preference to the use of institutional controls (such as deed
and access restrictions, monitoring, and provision of alternate
water supplies), containment methods (including caps, slurry walls,
and surface water diversion), and other interim measures, rather
than permanent treatment technologies, if such interim measures
are sufficient to protect the public health, welfare, and the environ-

ment. 94

In September of 1993, Representative Thomas J. Ridge (R-Pa.)
introduced a bill calling for differentiation of cleanup standards

290. Id. §§ 6018.405(B), 6020.512(B).
291. Joanne R. Denworth, Will Brownfields Initiatives Really Work?: Use Re-

stricted-Use Standards Sparingly, ENvTL. FORUM, May/June 1995, at 30.
292. In 1990, Congress reauthorized CERCLA through Sept. 30, 1994. The
taxing authority for Superfund will expire at the end of 1995. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 6301, 11231, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-419, 1444-45 (1988).
293. Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue
Options 122 (1992).
294. H.R. 1125, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1993).
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based on projected property use and deed restrictions to enforce
safe use of the property. 95 Representative Fred Upton (R-Mich.)
proposed legislation to encourage voluntary cleanup through siterelated standards and use of engineering and institutional controls.29 6 An add-on provision to a crime bill sponsored by Representative Michael A. Andrews (D-Tex.) also called for amending
CERCLA to give preference to the use of institutional controls. 9 7
The momentum for CERCLA revisions continued as the Senate
and House Subcommittees heard extensive testimony on
Superfund.2 8 Representatives from environmental organizations,
business, industry, banking, government, and academia participated
in the National Commission on Superfund. The Commission's 1993
report called for major reformation of CERCLA, especially in the
areas of local participation, liability, cleanup standards, and remedy
selection. 9
B. Superfund Reform in the 103d Congress
In February of 1994, the Clinton Administration presented its
proposal for the Superfund Reform Act of 1994, which was issued
in bill form by the House of Representatives, with a companion bill
in the Senate. 3' For several months afterwards, Congress appeared to be moving toward compromise legislation which would
retain retroactive liability for major polluters, but which would
significantly alter the existing law in order to expedite cleanups.
In the fall of 1994, Superfund activities ground to a halt in the
House of Representatives, in part, over the issue of wage levels for

295. H.R. 3043, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(5), 202(g) (1993).
296. H.R. 3620, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(4)(C)(iv) (1993).
297. H.R. 3721, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 534 (1994).
298. See S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 114-16 (1994); H.R. REP. No.
582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 163-66 (1994) (listing dates of hearings and
speakers).
299. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SUPERFUND, FINAL CONSENSUS
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SUPERFUND (1993) (on file with The
Keystone Center, Keystone, Co.).
300. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). To resolve their differences on H.R. 3800, the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Public Works and Transportation Committee
jointly developed a compromise bill, H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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persons employed at Superfund sites.31 . Republicans in both
Houses became increasingly reluctant to act on a Superfund revision initiated by the Democrats, especially since a "Republican"
Superfund seemed possible the next year, when the Republicans
would dominate both Houses of Congress. Though none of the bills
before the 103d Congress were enacted, the contents of the bills
indicate that Congress was receptive to many of the revisions that
had been included in State Superfund laws. °2
1. Liability
The issue of retroactive liability remained a point of contention in
the 103d Congress." 3 While none of the bills proposed abandoning retroactive liability, all would have relieved liability concerns
for many PRPs. "De micromis" PRPs would have been exempted
from liability3" while expedited settlements would be available
for "de minimis" contributors of pollution at a site.3 5 All of the

301. See James E. Satterfield, High Hopes and FailedExpectations: The Environmental Record of the 103d Congress, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,089, 10,092-094 (Feb., 1995).
302. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 14,221 (1994) (statement by Sen. Lautenberg
(D-N.J.), commenting on successful voluntary cleanups in New Jersey similar to
proposed Superfund reform before Congress).
303. See S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1994) (acknowledging
charges of "unfairness" in CERCLA's retroactive liability system, but citing court
support of the constitutionality of such a system); id. at 138 ("Minority Views"
stating that "retroactive liability, in principle, is wrong"); see also H.R. REP. No.
582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 256 (1994) ("Additional Views" by 21 members of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, stating that
"[i]t is inequitable to hold companies, individuals and units of local government
liable for activities which were entirely legal at the time undertaken").
304. S. 1834 § 403; H.R. 3800 § 403; H.R. 4916 § 403. "De micromis" parties
include residential owners, operators and lessees, small businesses, and small
non-profit organizations that contributed to municipal waste, parties who contributed less than 55 gallons of liquid or 100 pounds of solid hazardous substances to
a facility, and persons who acquired the contaminated property through inheritance or by bequest. S. 1834 § 403; H.R. 3800 § 403; H.R. 4916 § 403.

305. S. 1834 § 409; H.R. 3800 § 409; H.R. 4916 § 412. "De minimis" parties
are those whose contributions consisted of one percent or less of the total contamination and which contamination was not significantly more toxic than pollution from other PRPs. S. 1834 § 409; H.R. 3800 § 409; H.R. 4916 § 412.
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bills expanded opportunities for the government to use covenants
not to sue in pre-litigation settlements. 3" All of the bills also clarified the liability of lenders relative to contaminated properties. 7
Another major revision would have been the creation of a new
"fair share" allocation process,1 8 including use of a neutral arbitrator to allocate liability levels.3" In a significant break with past
law, the federal government would have been able to reimburse
PRPs for paying "orphan shares," those parts of the remediation
attributable to insolvent or defunct PRPs.3 1°
2. Containment and Remedy Selection
Despite strenuous objections from some environmentalists,31 ' all
versions of the Superfund Reform bills would have modified the
current law's preference for treating, rather than containing contamination. The bills stated that, as long as human health and the environment were protected, remediation could be accomplished by: (1)
treatment; (2) containment or other engineering controls; (3) a combination of treatment and containment; or (4) other, unspecified
methods. 312 Treatment would be preferred, however, for "Hot
concentrated, exceptionSpots," those portions of a site with highly
3 13
ally mobile, or non-containable pollution.
Congress adopted the idea of different levels of cleanup matched
314
to "reasonably anticipated future uses of land at a facility,
rather than axiomatic cleanup to unconstrained use levels. However,
Congress never reached a consensus on cleanup standards for
ground water. Congress was unable to agree on the basis for deter-

306. S. 1834 § 408; H.R. 3800 § 408; H.R. 4916 § 411.
307. S. 1834 §§ 407, 411; H.R. 3800 § 407; H.R. 4916 § 407.
308. S. 1834 § 409; H.R. 3800 § 412; H.R. 4916 § 413.
309. S. 1834 § 409; H.R. 3800 § 412; H.R. 4916 § 413.
310. S. 1834 § 409; H.R. 3800 § 412; H.R. 4916 § 413.
311. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 15, at 14 (regarding the Clinton
Administration's approach to Superfund reform, Mr. Pope says that "[a] facility
will be cleaned up with no more than its next purpose in mind ....The Administration proposal is, purely and simply, an unconscionable effort to transfer the
costs and risks from the present to future generations.").
312. S. 1834 § 502; H.R. 3800 § 502; H.R. 4916 § 502.
313. S. 1834 § 502; H.R. 3800 § 502; H.R. 4916 § 502.
314. S. 1834 § 502; H.R. 3800 § 502; H.R. 4916 § 502.
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mining when water had to be restored to levels acceptable for
drinking.315
3. Institutional Controls
All of the Superfund bills envisioned an increased role for institutional controls in remediation and reuse of contaminated sites. Unlike the existing CERCLA, the bills made frequent reference to
"institutional controls." Consideration of land disposition would
begin early in the Superfund process by having Community Work
Groups whose "primary purpose ... [would be] to recommend the
future land use at a site and any institutional controls required to
ensure that land use remains in effect."3'16 Senate Bill 1834 stated
that any response action which allows a hazardous substance to
remain at the site in levels above that set for unrestricted land use
'
must provide for "adequate institutional control."317
The Senate
Committee Report identified allowable institutional controls as
"land and resources use and deed restrictions, well drilling prohibitions, building permits, well use advisories and deed notices."318
4. Enforcement of Institutional Controls
The Report of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works indicates that the decision to make development of institutional controls mandatory in CERCLA may have been, in part, to
help provide for future enforcement of those controls. The commentary states that "[b]y making the development of institutional controls a mandatory duty, the bill allows the use of citizen suit au'
thority under CERCLA."319
Both House bills offered a different approach for enforcing institutional controls. They proposed incorporating use restrictions at a

315. S. 1834 § 501; H.R. 3800 § 501; H.R. § 501, 502. See S. REP. No. 349,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 79-85; H.R. REP. No. 582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
137, 151 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 114-16, 257-

58 (1994).
316.
317.
318.
319.

S. REP. No. 349, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1994).
S. 1834 § 502. See also H.R. 3800 § 502; H.R. 4916 § 502.
S. REP. No. 349 at 88 (quoting National Contingency Plan).
Id.
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site into federal hazardous substance easements.32 The President
would have to acquire hazardous substance easements at fair market
value, and the expense would be considered a recoverable
Superfund response cost. 2 The easements would be "enforceable
in perpetuity" against all current holders-in-interest or successorsin-interest, regardless of whether those interests were recorded.322
Such easements would be assignable,323 undergo a public notice
procedure to give interested parties the opportunity to comment,324
and be subject to termination if release terms were met.3z If use
restrictions were violated, the violator would be subject to
CERCLA enforcement actions and to citizen suits under CERCLA
section 3 10.36
The Committee members viewed the easement as the mechanism
necessary to "provide EPA with the flexibility to authorize a containment remedy, where appropriate, while assuring protection of
human health and the environment. ' 327 This remark appears to be
an oblique reference to the willingness of courts to enforce easements under traditional property law.32 When these easements
were acquired, the federal government would "record a notice of
property use restriction in the public land records for the jurisdiction in which the affected property is located," although absence of
such a filing would not negate the obligation for compliance.329
Filing would have to conform with state law.330
C. EPA Administrative Reforms on Land-Use Restrictions
Despite Congress's failure to pass the Superfund Reform Act of
1994, the EPA began initiating administrative reforms based on
concepts which had received support in the 103d Congress. In late
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

H.R. 3800 § 502; H.R. 4916 § 502.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. 3800 § 506; H.R. 4916 § 506.
H.R. REP. No. 582, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 121 (1994).
See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
H.R. 3800 § 506.

330. Id.
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May of 1995, EPA issued a directive entitled "Land Use in the
CERCLA Remedy Selection Process," and announced that it was
"the first in a series of steps that EPA would like to take in ad'
dressing land use at CERCLA sites."331
This directive recognizes that future use is an important factor in
establishing the level of remediation selected for a site.332 The
document differentiates between the more rigorous level of protection appropriate for residential sites compared with industrial
sites.333 It provides a synopsis of the agency's policy: "EPA expects to treat principal threats, to use engineering controls such as
containment for low-level threats, [and] to use institutional controls
'
to supplement engineering controls."334
In determining whether to select a containment remedy, EPA
must consider if there is a capable enforcing agent, described as an
"authority to implement the institutional control, and the appropriate entity's resolve and ability to implement the institutional con'
trol." 335
Examples of acceptable institutional controls are "deed
restrictions and deed notices, and adoption of land use controls by a
'
local government."336
EPA will conduct reviews at least every
five years to monitor sites subject to restrictions.337
Since this EPA directive has just been released, it would be speculation to anticipate exactly what impact it will have on actual
operations. The issuance of the directive, however, is in itself an
indication that the federal government, like a number of the states,
is now leaning towards a greater acceptance of institutional controls
in the remediation and reuse of contaminated sites than in the past.

331. Letter from Sherri A. Clark, Remedial Operations and Guidance Branch
(June 7, 1995) (describing EPA Directive No. 9355.7-04, issued May 25, 1995)
(on file with the U.S. EPA, Off. of Solid Waste and Emergency Response). This
directive concerns only land remediation, not ground water remediation; nor does
it apply to previous remedy selection decisions. Id. at 4.
332. Id. at 3.
333. Id. at 8.
334. Id. at 7.
335. Id. at 9-10.
336. Id. at 10.
337. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

In the early 1980s, public concern about pollution resulted in the
enactment of CERCLA and State Superfund laws, which sought
immediate and permanent cleanup of contamination. Experience has
revealed that there is far more contamination than originally imagined and that cleanup is often a long and expensive process. Oftentimes, the laws designed to effectuate cleanup have engendered
litigation and inaction, instead of remediation. Abandoned, polluted
sites are not uncommon and have taken a toll on our society. Their
presence is in itself a risk to humans and to nature. In addition,
there have been negative economic repercussions as the business
and banking communities avoid association with these contaminated
facilities. Communities near such sites have become moribund.
Federal and state governments are now exploring alternative
methods of dealing with contaminated property, seeking a paradigm
that will both satisfy environmental concerns and provide for economic rejuvenation. This reorientation became evident in New
Jersey's precedent-setting legislation in the late 1980s. The pattern
continues, as seen in recent state laws encouraging voluntary
remediation and brownfields cleanups. At the federal level, it is
visible in CERCLA section 120(h), which deals with transfer of
federal properties. It was manifest in proposed revisions to
Superfund during the 1994 reauthorization efforts, and it is present
in EPA's 1995 Superfund administrative reforms.
There appear to be several essential elements to this evolving,
revised model of Superfund. First, responsibility for liability is
tempered, particularly by offering closure to the threat of perpetual
liability. New liability strategies include apportioning "fair shares"
among responsible parties, offering financial and other incentives to
remediators who volunteer response actions or who settle liability
disputes, issuing covenants not to sue prospective purchasers and
financiers who redevelop property, and exempting minor contributors to the pollution. As this Article goes to press, the 104th Congress has not yet engaged in dialogue on specific bills to
reauthorize Superfund. The issue of liability is certain to be at the
heart of the upcoming congressional debate, as it involves complex
issues of public health, the environment, economic growth, and, the
most contentious issue, determining who should pay for cleanup---business or the public at large.
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A second essential element for the unfolding, revised Superfund
framework is a new approach to remedy selection. Superfund's
original objective was, in reality, cleanup to pre-contamination
levels at every site. The new approach bases cleanup standards on
health and environmental risks attached to the disposition of a site,
usually differentiating between residential and non-residential uses.
Containment is considered a viable remedy when it prevents unsafe
exposure, especially in instances of prohibitive cost or technically
infeasible cleanup.
Third, when containment is employed and residual pollution
remains at a facility, use restrictions (institutional controls) are put
into place to restrict access to or activity at the property. At the
state level, the trend is to require that institutional controls, in the
form of deed restrictions or notices, be registered in local land
records. In addition, the states statutorily affirm that such restrictions are binding on successors or assigns and "run with the
land." Without the latter provision, the use restrictions might be
challenged under common law for lack of privity and for being of
"in gross" benefit to the government.
The federal government also appears to favor the use of local
chain-of-title recordation of institutional controls. With the passage
of CERCLA section 120(h) dealing with the transfer of federal
lands, Congress acknowledged the need to use institutional controls,
such as deed notices, covenants, and easements, to foster redevelopment of land. Of course, using these institutional controls in the
context of section 120(h), where the federal government assumes
responsibility for future liability, is quite different than enforcing
such restrictions at privately owned sites. The federal government
has been inhibited from using institutional controls because land
regulation has traditionally been the prerogative of state and local
government. Also, federally imposed use restrictions, like those
required by the states, would encounter the common law courts'
reluctance to uphold long term encumbrances on the land.
To overcome fears about enforcing institutional controls, one
option explored by the 103d Congress was to have CERCLA mandate development of institutional controls as part of the remediation
process. This would enable the public to pursue citizen suits to
enforce the restrictions. Another option is for the federal government to require hazardous substance easements. The courts tend to
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uphold easements regardless of privity issues or the easement being
"in gross." Consequently, the federal government would have a
relatively high level of confidence in relying on easements to monitor and enforce compliance with use restrictions.
Increased participation by local governments and communities to
determine future land use for contaminated sites and to help select
the remediation for such sites, including institutional controls,
would remove conflicts about federalism. Also, if there were greater delegation of Superfund authority to the states, there would be
less risk of conflict over land use issues. Public awareness about
contamination has evolved in the years since Superfund was enacted. American society accepts that contamination will exist, that it
must be managed, and that information on contamination must be
readily available for such management to be effective. Consequently, institutional controls will play an increasing and important role
as state governments and the federal government attempt to reconcile competing environmental, economic, and social concernsy

